Date of Hearing: June 15, 2022

# ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ELECTIONS Isaac G. Bryan, Chair SB 1131 (Newman) – As Amended April 18, 2022

#### AS PROPOSED TO BE AMENDED

**SENATE VOTE**: 30-8

**SUBJECT**: Safe at Home program: election workers and reproductive health care providers.

**SUMMARY:** Creates an address confidentiality program for election workers who face harassment or threats, and allows such election workers to have their voter registration information made confidential. Expands an existing address confidentiality program for reproductive health care services providers, employees, volunteers, and patients such that harassment of a person is a basis for a person's participation in the program. Specifically, **this bill**:

- 1) Requires a county elections official, upon application of an election worker, to make confidential that worker's residence address, telephone number, and email address appearing on the worker's voter registration affidavit, as specified.
  - a) Requires the election worker's application to contain a statement, signed under penalty of perjury, that the person is an election worker and that a life-threatening circumstance exists as to the election worker or a member of the worker's family. Provides that this application is a public record.
  - b) Terminates the confidentiality granted under this bill after two years and allows an election worker to submit a new application to extend the confidentiality for two additional years.
  - c) Provides that all of the following apply to an election worker granted confidential voter status under this provision:
    - i) Requires the elections official, in producing any list, roster, or index, to exclude voters with a confidential voter status.
    - ii) Requires the election worker, within 60 days of moving to a new county, to apply for confidential voter status in the new county. Requires the elections official of the new county, upon notice of the confidential voter moving into the county, to do all of the following:
      - (1) Contact the confidential voter and provide information regarding the application for confidential voter status in the new county.
      - (2) Honor the confidential voter status from the former county for 60 days from the date of notice.

- (3) Exclude the confidential voter in any list, roster, or index during the 60-day period.
- (4) Remove the confidential voter status if the election worker has not obtained confidential voter status in the new county during the 60-day period.
- d) Prohibits an action in negligence from being maintained against a government entity, officer, or employee as a result of the disclosure of the information made confidential under the provisions of this bill, except by a showing of gross negligence or willfulness.
- e) Provides, for the purpose of these provisions, that the term "election worker" means a person who is employed by or contracts with the Secretary of State (SOS) or a local election office who performs election-related work and interacts with the public or is observed by the public doing election-related work, but does not include a person who is a precinct board member and who does not otherwise perform election-related work.
- 2) Repeals a requirement that elections officials include the names of precinct board members assigned to a precinct in lists that the official is required to post and distribute identifying the polling place for each precinct. Requires instead that the list include the political party preferences of precinct board members.
- 3) Creates the Address Confidentiality for Election Workers program.
  - a) Permits an adult person who is domiciled in California to apply to the SOS to have an address designated by the SOS to serve as the person's address, subject to specified conditions, if the applicant is an election worker or immediate relative of an election worker, who is fearful for their safety or the safety of their family due to their or their immediate relative's capacity as an employee or contractor of an election office, and the office or one of its employees was the target of threats or acts of violence or harassment within one year of the date of the application.
  - b) Requires applications submitted by an election office or its employees to be accompanied by payment of a fee, determined by the SOS, not to exceed the actual costs of enrolling in the program. Allows the SOS to assess annual fees to election workers who are participants in the program to defray the actual costs of maintaining the program.
  - c) Provides that approved applications are certified for four years following the date of filing unless the certification is withdrawn or invalidated before that date. Requires the SOS to establish a renewal procedure. Permits a program participant who is a minor and who reaches 18 years of age to renew as an adult following the renewal procedures established by the SOS.
  - d) Provides that each participant in this program shall have a substitute address designated by the SOS that the participant may use when the person is required to provide an address to a state or local agency. Requires every state or local agency, with limited exceptions, to accept the substitute address when creating a public record.

- e) Requires the SOS to forward all first-class mail and all mail sent by governmental agencies to the appropriate program participants.
- f) Permits a program participant who is otherwise qualified to vote to have the information relating to the person's residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address appearing on the participant's voter registration affidavit, or on any list, index, or roster of registered voters, declared confidential.
- g) Provides for the purpose of this program that the term "election worker," means a person who is employed by or contracts with the SOS or a local election office who performs election-related work and interacts with the public or is observed by the public doing election-related work, including a person who works as a precinct board member.
- h) Makes various findings and declarations, including the following:
  - i) Persons working in the elections field are often subject to harassment, threats, and acts of violence by persons or groups.
  - ii) Violent threats and harassment of election workers reached alarming levels in the 2020 general election and continued into 2021. A survey of election officials in 2021 found that one in three election officials feel unsafe because of their job, and nearly one in five listed threats to their lives as a job-related concern.
  - iii) The names, photographs, and home addresses of these public servants have been posted on internet websites. While performing election-related duties, election officials were subjected to explicit death threats, anger-laden language and demoralizing behavior, statements that threatened their own and their family's safety and well-being, and statements that interfered with their ability to do their job.
  - iv) Experts predict a massive departure from the profession of election administration if protective measures are not implemented. In California, 15 percent of election officials have retired since the 2020 election.
- 4) Includes harassment of a reproductive health care services facility or any of its providers, employees, volunteers, or patients, as a basis for a person's application in the Safe at Home program for a reproductive health care service provider, employee, or volunteer or their families because of their affiliation with the facility, as specified. Defines "harassment" as conduct, including following or stalking, making phone calls, or sending correspondence that would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety or the safety of their immediate relative.
- 5) Makes technical and corresponding changes.
- 6) Contains an urgency clause, allowing this bill to take effect immediately upon enactment.

#### **EXISTING LAW:**

1) Establishes the following two programs, collectively known as the Safe at Home program:

- a) The Address Confidentiality for Victims of Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault, Stalking, Human Trafficking, or Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse program; and,
- b) The Address Confidentiality for Reproductive Health Care Service Providers, Employees, Volunteers, and Patients program.
- 2) Allows a person who is a victim of domestic violence, sexual assault, stalking, human trafficking, or elder or dependent adult abuse, or who is a reproductive health care services provider, employee, volunteer, or patient, and who fears for his or her safety or the safety of the person's family, to participate in the Safe at Home program by applying to the SOS at a designated community based assistance program.
- 3) Provides that each participant in the Safe at Home program shall have a substitute address designated by the SOS that the participant may use when the person is required to provide an address to a state or local agency. Requires every state or local agency, with limited exceptions, to accept the substitute address when creating a public record.
- 4) Requires the SOS to forward all first-class mail and all mail sent by governmental agencies to the appropriate Safe at Home participants.
- 5) Requires applications for the Safe at Home program that are submitted by a reproductive health care services facility, its providers, employees, or volunteers to be accompanied by payment of a fee determined by the SOS, and permits the SOS to assess annual fees to those individuals to defray the actual costs of maintaining that program. Prohibits an applicant who is a patient of a reproductive health care services facility from being required to pay an application fee or the annual fee under this program.
- 6) Allows a participant in the Safe at Home program to have the information relating to the person's residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address appearing on the participant's voter registration card, or on any list, index, or roster of registered voters, declared confidential.
- 7) Provides that any voter may have the voter's residence address, telephone number, and email address from the voter registration card declared confidential upon order of a superior court issued upon showing of good cause that a life threatening circumstance exists to the voter or a member of the voter's household.
- 8) Provides that any public safety officer may have the officer's residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address from the voter registration card declared confidential if the county board of supervisors in the officer's county of residence authorizes such confidentiality and if the public safety officer attests that a life threatening circumstance exists to that officer or to the officer's family.
- 9) Provides that the home address, telephone number, e-mail address, precinct number, or other number specified by the SOS for voter registration purposes, and prior registration information shown on the voter registration affidavit for all registered voters, are confidential, and shall not be disclosed to any person, except that such information shall be provided with respect to any voter to any candidate for federal, state, or local office, to any committee for or against any initiative or referendum measure for which legal publication is

made, and to any person for election, scholarly, journalistic, or political purposes, or for governmental purposes, as determined by the SOS, as specified.

10) Requires the elections official to post, not less than one week before an election, a list of polling places and of the precinct board members appointed to serve at that election by the 15th day before the election. Requires lists of polling places and precinct board members to be posted at the office of the elections official and on the official's website, if any. Requires any list of precinct board members that is posted or distributed by the elections official to include the political party preference of each precinct board member, as specified. Provides that these provisions do not apply to elections conducted using vote centers.

**FISCAL EFFECT**: Unknown. State-mandated local program; contains a crimes and infractions disclaimer; contains reimbursement direction.

#### **COMMENTS**:

1) Author's Amendments: As currently in print, this bill creates two different mechanisms for an election worker to have certain personal information from the worker's voter registration record made confidential. First, a worker who certifies that a life-threatening circumstance exists to the worker or a member of their family can apply to have the worker's residence address, telephone number, and email address from the worker's voter registration made confidential. Alternately, a worker could apply to participate in the Address Confidentiality for Election Workers program, which may include confidentiality of personal information from the worker's voter registration record, but also includes additional confidentiality protections and procedures.

After the committee's deadline for pre-committee author's amendments, the author proposed amendments to specify that precinct board members would be eligible to participate in the Address Confidentiality for Election Workers program, but would not be eligible to apply for voter registration confidentiality under the other provisions of this bill that apply to election workers. This analysis reflects those proposed author's amendments.

2) **Purpose of the Bill**: According to the author:

Free and fair elections play an essential role in a democratic society and are a hallowed cornerstone of American democracy. In recent years, however, the dedicated and diligent public servants charged with administering California's elections have been subjected to threats, intimidation, and sometimes physical violence at polling places, in their offices, and even at their homes. SB 1131 reduces the likelihood that poll workers may be subject to doxing and targeting, by allowing California's elections workers to enroll in the "Safe at Home" Program, administered by the Secretary of State, which provides protection to survivors of domestic violence and people who work at reproductive care facilities. This bill also includes an alternative option that allows elections workers to withhold their private information from public records requests for those that don't wish to enroll in "Safe at Home", thereby expanding the personal protection and privacy they deserve. This legislation is vital in order to protect Californians who work tirelessly to conduct our free and fair elections.

3) Safe at Home Background: California's Address Confidentiality for Victims of Domestic Violence program was created by SB 489 (Alpert), Chapter 1005, Statutes of 1998, modeled after a program in the state of Washington that was intended to allow an individual who experienced or who feared domestic violence to keep the person's residential address confidential and to provide a substitute address for use by state and local agencies in public records. A participant in the program uses a substitute address provided by the SOS, who forwards the participant's mail to their actual address. State and local agencies are required to accept the substitute address, except in certain limited cases, when presented proof that a person is participating in the program. Additionally, participants are allowed to have their voter registration information kept entirely confidential from campaigns, pollsters, and the media by completing a confidential voter registration affidavit.

When originally enacted, only victims of domestic violence were eligible to participate in the program. Since that time, the program was expanded to allow participation by victims of stalking (SB 1318 (Alpert), Chapter 562, Statutes of 2000), victims of sexual assault (SB 1062 (Bowen), Chapter 639, Statutes of 2006), victims of human trafficking (SB 597 (Leyva), Chapter 570, Statutes of 2017), and victims of elder or dependent adult abuse (SB 1320 (Stern), Chapter 1320, Statutes of 2018). Additionally, in September 2020, Governor Newsom issued executive order N-80-20, which authorized the SOS to allow local health officers and other public health officials to participate in the program due to threats and other harassment of those individuals in connection with their contributions to protecting public health against COVID-19. According to the SOS, nine local health officers and other public health officials were enrolled in the address-confidentiality program while the executive order was in effect. Those individuals remain in the program, but other local health officers and other public health officials are no longer eligible to apply for, or participate in the program, even if they face serious risks of violence or threats of violence at work, because the executive order has expired.

Separately, AB 797 (Shelley), Chapter 380, Statutes of 2002, created a related program for reproductive health care services providers and their employees, volunteers, and patients. While the provisions of the two programs are very similar, participants in the program created by AB 797, other than reproductive health care services patients, are required to pay an application fee and an annual fee to participate in the program. According to the SOS, the current fees for those participants are a \$30 application fee and a \$75 annual fee. Although the reproductive health care services program is identified in state law separately from the program to provide substitute addresses for victims of domestic violence, stalking, sexual assault, human trafficking, and elder or dependent adult abuse, the two programs are frequently referred to collectively as the "Safe at Home" program.

According to a January 10, 2022 report by the SOS, the Safe at Home program currently serves 5,546 individuals. Of those participants, 903 have applied to have their residence address, telephone number, and email address from the participant's voter registration record made confidential.

As currently drafted, this bill would create a separate address confidentiality program for election workers that is similar to the existing program for reproductive health care service employees. However, the version of the program created by this bill is slightly different than the existing program. For example, while existing law *requires* applicants for the program for reproductive health care service employees to meet with a counselor to receive orientation

information about the program, this bill instead provides that the application process for the address confidentiality program it creates *may* include a requirement for the applicant to meet with a counselor. These types of small differences in the address confidentiality programs offered under California law could complicate administration of those programs, and result in inconsistent treatment of individuals who are enrolled in the programs.

Rather than creating a new address confidentiality program specifically for election workers who face threats or harassment, the author may wish instead to consider amending the provisions of law that govern the existing program for reproductive health care service employees to allow participation by election workers who fear for their safety due to threats or acts of violence against the election office where the person works. Such an approach could help ensure that all Safe at Home program participants are subject to the same enrollment process, orientation, and counseling provided under existing law.

4) Harassment of and Threats to Election Workers: According to information provided by the author and co-sponsors of this bill, election officials across the country have increasingly been subject to harassment, intimidation, and threats, including death threats, particularly leading up to and since the 2020 presidential election. Through public records requests, interviews, and examinations of online posts, the Reuters News Agency has documented more than 850 threatening and hostile messages directed at elections workers related to the 2020 election, and reported that about 110 of those messages appeared to meet thresholds for federal prosecution as true threats. In June 2021, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the creation of an Election Threats Task Force to address the increase in threats to elections officials. The task force has brought charges against two individuals thus far

Surveys of elections officials conducted since the 2020 general election and commissioned by the Brennan Center for Justice—one of the co-sponsors of this bill—found that one in three election officials felt unsafe because of their job, that one in six elections officials had been threatened because of their job, and that 30% personally knew of election officials or election workers who left their jobs partly due to safety concerns, threats, or intimidation.

In an effort to learn more about what can be done to protect election administrators from harassment and other types of threats, the Brennan Center for Justice, the Bipartisan Policy Center, and the Harvard Kennedy School's Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation interviewed nearly three dozen elections officials and over 30 experts who work in a wide-range of election, security, and criminal procedure-related fields. Subsequently, the Brennan Center and Bipartisan Policy Center released a report in June 2021 that included various recommendations for protecting election workers. One of the report's recommendations was to provide greater protection of personally identifiable information of elections officials. As a part of that recommendation, the report specifically mentioned programs that protect domestic violence and stalking victims such as California's Safe at Home program as a potential model for protecting the personal information of election workers who have been threatened.

Also in June 2021, the California Voter Foundation (the other co-sponsor of this bill) published a report titled "Documenting and Addressing Harassment of Election Officials." The report attempted to understand the kinds of harassment faced by election officials throughout the United States leading up to, during, and resulting from the 2020 presidential

election. The report included five recommendations to help combat the harassment and threats faced by election officials, including strengthening legal protections for election officials.

5) **Voter Registration Confidentiality**: As detailed above, the voter registration information for *every voter* is confidential under existing law, though certain information from a voter's registration records are available for specified election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes. When information is provided to individuals and organizations pursuant to these provisions, a voter's driver's license number, identification number, partial social security number, and signature are not disclosed. A person who wishes to receive voter registration information from the SOS or a county elections official for one of those permissible purposes is required to make an application setting forth the person's name, address, telephone number, driver's license number or the number of another identification approved by the SOS, the specific information requested, and a statement of the intended use of the information requested. The elections official is also required to verify the person's identity before providing any voter registration information, and completed applications are required to be retained by the elections official for five years.

In certain situations, state law provides a greater level of confidentiality of a voter's registration records, and prohibits the disclosure of the voter's residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address even for election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes for which that information would otherwise be available under existing law. As detailed above, participants in California's Safe at Home program are eligible for such protections. Additionally, existing law permits a voter to have the voter's residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address from the voter's registration record declared confidential by order of a superior court upon showing that a life threatening circumstance exists to the voter or a member of the voter's household. Finally, state law provides similar confidentiality to public safety officers who attest that a life threatening circumstance exists to that officer or the officer's family if the county board of supervisors in the officer's county of residence has authorized such a program.

The number of voters who have confidential voter registrations pursuant to these provisions is small; according to information from the SOS, fewer than 2,500 voters statewide have confidential voter registration status, including the approximately 900 voters who have confidential voter registration status as part of the Safe at Home program.

This bill would create two new procedures for an election worker to prevent the disclosure of the voter's residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address for election, scholarly, journalistic, political, or governmental purposes. First, election workers (including precinct board members) who fear for their safety would be eligible to participate in a new Address Confidentiality for Election Workers program that is similar to the existing Safe at Home program. Alternately, an election worker (but not including a precinct board member) who attests that a life threatening circumstance exists to the worker or the worker's family could apply to have the voter's residence address, telephone number, and e-mail address from the that voter's registration record declared confidential, similar to the program that exists for certain public safety workers, as described above.

This bill could significantly expand the number of people eligible for voter registration confidentiality. According to information from the federal Election Assistance Commission's

Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report, California had more than 48,000 precinct board members who worked at the November 2020 general election alone. While it is likely that the vast majority of those workers do not face life-threatening circumstances as a result of their service as a precinct board member, if even a small percentage of these individuals applied for voter registration confidentiality under this bill, it could significantly increase the number of registrations that are confidential under California law.

6) **Posting of Poll Workers' Names**: In an effort to protect precinct board members (also referred to as poll workers) from harassment and threats, this bill eliminates a requirement for elections officials to include the names of precinct board members assigned to each precinct in lists that the official is required to post and distribute identifying the polling place for each precinct, and instead requires that the list include only the party preferences of precinct board members.

The requirement for elections officials to post the names of precinct board members assigned to each precinct is a longstanding one, dating back to at least 1903. Until 2006, state law required that the names of precinct board members be published in a newspaper of general circulation not less than one week before the election. In an effort to reduce costs to local elections officials, AB 1757 (Elections & Redistricting Committee), Chapter 201, Statutes of 2005, maintained the requirement for the list of polling places to be published in a newspaper of general circulation, but provided that the names of precinct board members did not need to be published and instead were required to be posted in the elections official's office and on the official's website. SB 286 (Stern), Chapter 806, Statutes of 2017, made various changes to state election laws to facilitate the conduct of elections using vote centers in lieu of polling places, including providing that the requirement for elections officials to post the names of precinct board members did not apply to elections conducted using vote centers. Because vote centers are open for an extended period of time (up to 11 days), elections officials felt that posting the names of precinct board members who were working at those vote centers in advance would be impractical because the workers at a given vote center could change from day-to-day and with relatively little advance notice to ensure that vote centers were appropriately staffed at all times. As of this month's statewide primary election, 27 counties (Alameda, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, El Dorado, Fresno, Kings, Los Angeles, Madera, Marin, Mariposa, Merced, Napa, Nevada, Orange, Riverside, Sacramento, San Benito, San Diego, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Sonoma, Stanislaus, Tuolumne, Ventura, and Yolo), comprising more than three-quarters of California's registered voters, are conducting elections pursuant to the California Voter's Choice Act, under which counties conduct elections where vote centers are available prior to and on election day, in lieu of operating polling places. As a result, many poll workers in California are not required to have their names publicly posted under existing law.

7) **Suggested Amendments**: Existing law requires the SOS to submit an annual report to the Legislature that includes the total number of applications received for the Safe at Home program, disclosing the number of program participants within each county and describing any allegations of misuse relating to election purposes. Because of the potential for this bill to significantly expand the number of people eligible for voter registration confidentiality, as described in more detail above, committee staff recommends amendments to this bill to impose similar reporting requirements for the address confidentiality program and the voter registration confidentiality process created by this bill.

Additionally, committee staff recommends the following technical amendments to this bill:

- a) On page 5, line 29, strike out "if available in the new county,".
- b) On page 5, line 38, strike out "(2) of subdivision (b)" and insert "(1)".
- c) On page 6, line 19, strike out "affiliation" and insert "preference".
- d) On page 6, line 23, strike out "affiliations" and insert "preferences".
- 8) **Arguments in Support**: One of the co-sponsors of this bill, the California Voter Foundation, writes in support:

Over the past two years, those charged with administering California's elections have been increasingly subjected to targeted threats of violence, harassment and intimidation. Election workers face the risk of "doxing" and harassment as the result of their names, photographs, and addresses being posted online and on social media platforms, as has happened to numerous election officials already around the country. Since November 2020, more than 15 percent of California's election officials have left their jobs, some citing increased aggressive and abusive behavior targeted at them.

The "Safe at Home" program has been operating in California over two decades and enables survivors of domestic violence and stalking to shield their personal data from public exposure. Access to this program, which is administered by the California Secretary of State, has been extended to other workers in sensitive positions - reproductive health workers in 2002 and public health officials in 2020. Election officials and their staff, who are the frontline workers of democracy, deserve and are in need of similar protection.

SB 1131 will provide protection and peace of mind to California election workers by extending to them the option of enrolling in one of two existing address protection programs. Eligibility for the Secretary of State's "Safe at Home" Program would be extended to individuals who are employed by or contract with the Secretary of State or a local election office in election-related work, allowing election workers the opportunity to have their mail redirected to a substitute mailing address. Alternatively, election workers may choose to enroll in an address confidentiality program that enables state and local agencies to respond to requests for public records without disclosing the address of election workers...

The California Voter Foundation has successfully advanced election security in the state and nation for over two decades. But it was not until the 2020 Presidential Election that we realized the physical safety and well-being of the people who administer our elections is an essential component of election security. California's voting process is already among the most secure in the country; if enacted, SB 1131 will help ensure that the people entrusted with administering it are also safe and secure.

9) **Arguments in Opposition**: In opposition to this bill, the Right to Life League writes:

SB 1131 creates a special class of citizens entitled to special confidentiality under the law. It will amend current law to carve out a special right to enroll in the Safe At Home program for both election workers and anyone who seeks an abortion, or works or volunteers at an abortion facility if they are "fearful for their health or safety, or their families' health or safety because of their affiliation with a reproductive health care services facility."

The applicant must make a nominal showing that the abortion facility "or any of its providers, employees, volunteers, or patients is or was the target of threats or acts of violence within one year of the date of the application."

This is an overbroad period that conflicts with already established criminal law by failing to include an objective test, such as a reasonable person standard, to evaluate whether the speaker intends to act on the "threat" against the facility.

Such a definition may include sarcasm or protected First Amendment activities such as peaceful protests, picketing, opinionated speech or unfavorable news coverage for that matter.

SB 1131 is also unnecessary. The crime of assault is already defined and illegal under California Penal Code Section 240 as an "attempt . . . to commit a violent injury on the person of another...." SB 1131 "target of threats" language expands, confuses and conflicts with this definition.

- 10) **Related Legislation**: AB 2381 (Daly) would have allowed individuals who face threats of violence because of their work, employment, or volunteer service to participate in the Safe at Home program. AB 2381 was approved by the Assembly Judiciary Committee on a 10-0 vote, but was held on the Assembly Appropriations Committee's suspense file.
- 11) **Double-Referral**: This bill has been double-referred to the Assembly Judiciary Committee.

### **REGISTERED SUPPORT / OPPOSITION:**

## Support

Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law (co-sponsor)
California Voter Foundation (co-sponsor)
350 South Bay Los Angeles (prior version)
American Association of University Women - California
California Association of Clerks & Election Officials
California Environmental Voters
City Clerks Association of California
Clean Coalition (prior version)
Cloverdale Indivisible (prior version)
Indivisible Alta Pasadena (prior version)
Indivisible California Green Team (prior version)
Indivisible Marin (prior version)

Indivisible Media City Burbank (prior version)

Indivisible Mendocino (prior version)

Indivisible Resistance San Diego (prior version)

Indivisible Riverside (prior version)

Indivisible Ross Valley (prior version)

Indivisible Sacramento (prior version)

Indivisible San Jose (prior version)

Indivisible Sonoma County (prior version)

Indivisible South Bay LA (prior version)

Indivisible Stanislaus (prior version)

League of Women Voters of California

Livermore Indivisible (prior version)

Long Beach Alliance for Clean Energy (prior version)

Orange County Employees Association (prior version)

Progressive Democrats of Santa Monica Mountains (prior version)

Resistance Northridge-Indivisible (prior version)

Socal 350 (prior version)

Stand Strong LA Indivisible (prior version)

Valley Women's Club of San Lorenzo Valley (prior version)

# **Opposition**

Right to Life League

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